In re Domestic Partnership of Torres Campos and Munoz

What happened

In re Domestic Partnership of Torres Campos and Munoz began as a dispute between former domestic partners over shared custody and visitation of a dog under Family Code section 2605. The respondent was represented pro bono by Roxanne Chung Bonar.

Bonar's letter declining the request relied on "Marriage of Twigg (1984) 34 Cal.3d 926" and on Marriage of Teegarden, cited to 1995 and 33 Cal.App.4th 1572. Twigg is not a real case; its official citation belongs to People v. Mozingo, a criminal case. Teegarden as cited does not exist either; the real 1986 decision, at 181 Cal.App.3d 401, concerned spousal support. The respondent's declaration repeated Twigg, and the appellant's reply did not flag it.

A court commissioner sat as temporary judge by stipulation. After an unreported hearing on September 19, 2024, the appellant's counsel prepared the order, which the commissioner approved and signed. It stated: "The Court notes the follow[ing] cases: Marriage of Twigg (1984) 34 Cal.3d 926 and Marriage of Teegarden (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1572" and denied pet custody.

On appeal, after the appellant finally called the cases invented, Bonar answered that "Both cases are valid, published precedents" and supplied parallel reporter citations and a decision date for Twigg that the court found were also fictitious. She later admitted Twigg did not exist and traced it to a Reddit article by a non-attorney blogger. At oral argument she conceded she may have obtained the fictitious information using AI tools.

What the court did

Writing for the panel, Justice Buchanan stated: "We have no difficulty concluding that it is an abuse of discretion for a court to rely in material part on fictional case authorities in rendering a decision or making an order." The order in Torres Campos erred in that way, but the panel held the claim forfeited, because the appellant's own counsel drafted and submitted the order and never objected. The opinion stresses that "It is particularly important for an attorney to verify the citations contained in any proposed order submitted for signature by the court." A separate argument for a multi-factor pet-custody test failed for want of a record of the hearing, and the order was affirmed.

On sanctions, the court found an unreasonable violation of the Rules of Court under rule 8.276(a)(4). It viewed the conduct as more serious than earlier sanctions of $1,500 and $1,750 because counsel persisted after being told Twigg was fictitious and never explained the source of the added citation details. In Torres Campos the court:

• ordered Bonar to pay $5,000 to the clerk within 30 days after the remittitur;
• directed the clerk to send the opinion to the State Bar under Business and Professions Code section 6086.7(a)(3), and ordered Bonar to self-report under section 6068(o)(3);
• recommended in footnote 3 that "the Judicial Council or other appropriate committees consider adopting guidelines or rules for judges and attorneys on verification of citations, particularly those in orders drafted by the parties and submitted to the court for signature."

Where it stands

Torres Campos was certified for publication. A later unpublished Fifth District opinion cites it as 118 Cal.App.5th 1112 and quotes its abuse-of-discretion passage; that matter is recorded at H.C. v. Contreras. Torres Campos itself drew on Noland v. Land of the Free and Shahid v. Esaam.

Whether the sanction has been paid, and whether the State Bar has acted, was not located as of October 21. The record does not show whether the Judicial Council has taken up the footnote 3 recommendation.

The obligation it engaged

Clause 3 of the Standard, independent authority, is the clause Torres Campos engages most directly. Bonar said she "mistakenly assumed that, because these materials were part of the Superior Court's official record, the citations had already been vetted and could be relied upon as accurate." Clause 4, checkability before adoption, describes what failed at the bench: a party-drafted order was signed without anyone opening the cases it named. Clause 2, non-delegation, frames the same event from the court's side, and Clause 7, contemporaneous record, explains why counsel could not say where the added Twigg details came from.

The lesson for an expert witness is concrete. A citation that already appears in a prior filing, a court order or a retaining attorney's draft has not been verified by appearing there. An expert who repeats it in a report or declaration should open the source, confirm that it says what is claimed, and keep a note of where each authority came from.

Sources

• California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District (copy hosted for the AI Hallucination Cases database) · March 5, 2026
  In re Domestic Partnership of Torres Campos and Munoz, D085584, opinion filed 3/5/26
• California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District · May 28, 2026
  H.C. v. Contreras, F089316 (nonpublished opinion citing Campos and Munoz, 118 Cal.App.5th 1112)

What could not be confirmed

The opinion gives the panel's surnames only. The Official Reports citation (118 Cal.App.5th 1112) is taken from the later H.C. v. Contreras opinion, not from a reporter. The court described the Teegarden citation as apparently generated by AI and recorded counsel's concession that AI tools may have been the source; it made no finding naming a tool. Payment of the sanction, any State Bar action and any Judicial Council response were not located as of 2026-10-21.